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Russia’s accelerating authoritarian turn has not ignored the internet, and in recent years, 
the Russian state has clamped down on internet activities that diverge from the statist line, 
employing a variety of strategies to dominate online spaces. Nevertheless, oppositional 
voices flourish on the Russian internet, taking shape in independent blogs and videos. This 
paper explores three political bloggers through surveillant and resistance assemblages, 
making sense of this contestation through an interpretation of the Deleuzian virtual that 
underscores the emancipatory potential of online activities for producing more egalitarian 
configurations, but also taking stock of the ways that these technologies have increased 
domination. Encompassing the blurriness between digital and corporeal spaces, the paper 
contributes by revealing new geographies of contestation against state strategies to 
dominate the Russian internet. Overlapping with but not corresponding to Russian 
territorial boundaries, these dynamics highlight shifting spaces of power and resistance in 
the increasingly illiberal world.   
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Introduction: Negotiating authoritarian closures in Russia 
In July 2013, Maria Motuznaya answered an unexpected knock at her flat in Barnaul, a 
medium-sized Siberian city. She opened the door to find police officers with a warrant. They 
searched her flat, seized her phone and computer, and took her for questioning to the 
Directorate for Combating Extremism at the regional office of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. There, she learned her crime: saving pictures to an album on VK, Russia’s Facebook 
clone and dominant social network (Motuznaya 2018a).  
 
Over several years, Motuznaya had saved thousands of humorous and political images to 
her private VK folder (Golubev 2018). She was not an activist, but merely a politically 
progressive atheist fond of memes that ridiculed Orthodox believers and that mocked 
corruption within the Russian Orthodox Church (Motuznaya 2018b). For saving memes, 
Motuznaya was pressured into signing a confession and then charged with inciting hatred 
against protected groups. She was added to the government watchlist for terrorists and 
extremists, lost access to her bank account, and later fled to Ukraine (BBC Russkaya Sluzhba 
2018).  
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Motuznaya’s story does more than highlight the increasingly repressive climate during 
Vladimir Putin’s third and fourth terms as president (Gel’man 2015b; Treisman 2018). Her 
surveillance and arrest expose the intensification of efforts to enact authoritarian control 
within but also beyond the digital. These state strategies speak to the blurriness between 
digital and corporeal domains and, in so doing, they provide an opportunity to explore new 
geographies of domination and resistance. Beginning from this blurriness, I ask how the 
Russian authoritarian turn is expressed across these fluid, contingent, and more-or-less 
digital realities of contemporary life (Merrill et al. 2020). However, I focus neither on the 
online presence of political activists, nor on the connections between online opposition and 
mass protest in the street. Instead, I explore how people with a significant online presence 
negotiate these increasing closures to remain safe and continue their lives and livelihoods. 
Thus, I follow three bloggers who framed themselves to greater or lesser degrees in 
opposition to dominant neoconservative and statist narratives. This distinction - between 
outright political activism and simply making an online living by producing content with 
various degrees of political engagement – results in a different perspective on Russia’s 
ongoing authoritarian closures, one that underscores the decreasing possibilities for political 
discussion of any sort. Ultimately, each of these three bloggers attracted repressive state 
attention and, given that their livelihoods depended on their online activities, each 
attempted in their own ways to evade state pressures, stay safe, and continue working. 
Exploring the tactics they used provides nuance to discussions on the tension between 
safety and visibility facing online activists in authoritarian spaces (Lokot 2018). The paper 
contributes not only by identifying the tactics enacted by the bloggers, but also by exploring 
their outcomes across the blurry spectrum of the more-or-less digital, theorized from a 
perspective of Deleuzian virtuality that helps make sense of how and why the Russian state 
is working so fervently to control and punish online activity. 
 
 
The more-or-less digital RuNet through surveillant and resistance assemblages   
Our digital age, marked by nearly omnipresent computer technologies entwined with 
everyday life, has been described as the network society: where technological 
improvements allow horizontal, multidirectional, mass self-communication, with 
concomitant emancipatory potential (Castells 2015, 248). The new communications 
infrastructures that comprise the network society were seen by many as so-called liberation 
technology (Diamond 2010; Diamond and Plattner 2012), expanding political, social, and 
economic freedoms and potentially reorganizing more closed states towards transparency 
and democracy through the power of horizontal communication. In time, it has grown clear 
that these technologies can also expand state surveillance and control, strengthening global 
illiberalism through what Diamond (2019) ultimately called postmodern totalitarianism. This 
has been explored across a variety of authoritarian states, including China (MacKinnon 
2011; Qiang 2019), Turkey (Topak 2017; 2019), and Iran (Akbari 2020; Golkar 2011; 2016), 
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demonstrating how autocracies employ these technologies in variegated strategies to police 
and circumvent or suppress dissent.  
It is not accurate, however, to frame these technologies solely as contributing to the 
entrenchment of authoritarian control, and it is possible in each of these cases to perceive a 
more nuanced struggle between domination and resistance, played out in novel domains. 
This requires an acknowledgement that digital practices produce new spatialities that do 
not necessarily correspond to bounded representations of national territory (Dodge and 
Kitchin 2003; Kitchin 1998; Thrift 1996). Working with these sensibilities necessitates a 
departure from conceptualizing digital and corporeal domains as different and divided, and 
instead moving towards an understanding of the more-or-less digital (Lim 2015; Merrill et 
al. 2020). This contingent hybridity opens up new avenues through which to explore 
struggles against state surveillance and control, while the authoritarian turn in 
contemporary Russia provides an opportunity to unpack some underexplored dynamics 
within these conflicts.  
The Russian-language internet – colloquially knows as the RuNet – exemplifies the 
blurriness inherent in the more-or-less digital. RuNet is a broad term. It can refer to sites 
physically hosted within the territory of the Russian Federation; to sites with domain 
suffixes designating the countries as Russian-affiliated; or to Russian-language sites on the 
global internet, regardless of country. The RuNet has long been an outlet of free expression 
and a relatively safe environment for quasi-legal and illegal activities. Because the 
geography of the RuNet exists partially beyond the boundaries of Russian national territory, 
this relative freedom has persisted despite the context of increasing control driven by the 
authoritarian turn. Alongside this, two trends give the RuNet political relevance: first, after 
flirting with professional, independent journalism, traditional mass-audience media have 
increasingly come under control of state loyalists so that, despite modern trappings and 
state-of-the-art technologies, they function largely as mouthpieces for the state (Lipman, 
Kachkaeva, and Poyker 2018). In response, the RuNet has become a legitimate – though still 
minority – news source, and one of the few reliable places to find independent voices 
(Levada Center 2020). Second, internet use in Russia has risen sharply year-over-year, with a 
majority of the country now online: between 2008-2018, nationwide monthly use tripled – 
from 24% to 72% – while daily internet users spiked from 12% to 64% of the population 
(FOM 2018). This is a story that enrolls immaterial politics, infrastructure modernization, 
and social change all at once: online and offline domains are not separate, but rather 
interdependent and mutually permeable.  
The authoritarian turn has seen Russian law grow harsher towards activities that 
deviate from the statist line (Flikke 2016), and this extension of control includes the more-
or-less digital spaces of the RuNet. These efforts at domination are complicated by the fact 
that the RuNet exists not only within Russian territory but also beyond it. Viewing 
authoritarianism not as territorially bounded but rather as a set of practices (Glasius 2018) 
helps explain how the Russian state both sees and attempts to dominate the RuNet, both 
within and beyond Russian territory. These processes of monitoring and control are part of 
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what has come to be known as a surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), 
explaining how once-discrete security and information structures coalesce into a 
heterogeneous, all-encompassing, dynamic system. The surveillant assemblage is also at 
least partially flat, capturing enormous swaths of data on powerful and powerless alike, 
thereby – at least theoretically – leveling hierarchies to permit scrutiny of the powerful 
(Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 617). It is the combination of this potential scrutiny with the 
possibility of establishing new connections that drives state efforts to control the RuNet.  
Surveillant assemblages are not stable structures, however. Instead, they are 
rhizomatic: contingent, always-becoming, and immanent with potentiality (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013, 22). Nor are the individuals enrolled in this process without agency: as a 
surveillant assemblage coalesces around and identifies opposition forces, dissidents engage 
tactics to evade or thwart state efforts, which Akbari and Gabdulhakov (2019) conceptualize 
as a resistance assemblage. The dynamics between surveillant and resistance assemblages 
define much of the geography of the RuNet, intimately tied – but not limited – to spaces 
under Russian legal control, each perpetually agitating to reorder the rhizome in their favor, 
whether towards or against more consolidated state control.  
State efforts to dominate the RuNet have occurred in three phases: first through 
technologies of filtering access, second through legal frameworks and improved 
technological controls, and finally through propaganda and direct attacks (Deibert and 
Rohozinski 2010). The root of modern surveillance in Russia is the System of Operative-
Investigative Measures (SORM), a set of state orders and technologies requiring 
telecommunication providers to allow the federal security services to monitor all traffic  
(Soldatov and Borogan 2015). SORM runs in concert with the Federal Service for the 
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or 
RosKomNadzor. The noun nadzor has several possible translations in English, giving a sense 
for the breadth of its responsibilities: “supervision,” “control”, “surveillance”, and 
“policing”. RosKomNadzor grants broadcasting licenses, maintains a list of blacklisted 
websites, and monitors all mass communications – including the RuNet – and there are 
allegations that the agency has exercised these powers against state opponents (Novaya 
Gazeta 2019).  
Furthermore, recent amendments to the Russian Criminal Code have also 
contributed to the surveillant assemblage. Passed after Pussy Riot’s infamous anti-Putin 
cathedral performance (Steinholt 2013; Voronina 2013), Article 148 outlawed public 
expressions injurious to the feelings of religious believers, while Article 282 forbade the 
incitement of hatred against protected groups (OUKRF 2020). These new laws have been 
applied subjectively, snaring people for private behavior (such as what happened to Maria 
Motuznaya), or targeting political opponents (Kosovan 2016). Another law forces any site 
with more than 3000 daily views to register with RosKomNadzor (BBC 2014), and any 
organization, journalist, or blogger that receives international funding must register as a 
foreign agent (Roth 2019; Skibo 2017). The aim is to chill free expression by reducing or 
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eliminating online anonymity, while diminishing the introduction of non-state narratives by 
weakening or destroying international linkages.  
One of the problems for the increasingly authoritarian Russian state is the fact that 
its legal reach is limited to national borders. This is not to say that extralegal activities do 
not occur, but rather to emphasize that many resistance assemblages rely on the RuNet 
existing beyond Russian territorial control. To combat this, a new law was passed to require 
that foreign internet companies use servers located within Russia (Karnaukh 2015). This 
ensures that RosKomNadzor commands information flows and that SORM provides access 
to the security services. An understanding of the more-or-less digital helps explain these 
state strategies to extend the surveillant assemblage: the RuNet is simultaneously 
immaterial and yet inescapably tethered to physical infrastructures, just as it is borderless 
but also governed by laws within state borders. This complicates the idea that surveillance 
regimes are detached from territorial boundaries (Murakami Wood 2013) and provides a 
potential explanation for certain state strategies to regulate online spaces.  
 
Informational autocracy and the virtual  
Despite the increase in authoritarian practices, the Russian state does not engage in crude 
mass repression. Instead, it is an informational autocracy (Guriev and Treisman 2015; 2019), 
wherein leadership is presented as competent and benevolent, and outright repression is 
kept to a minimum. Control over the media landscape is key to this strategy, since the 
spread of dissenting perspectives threatens the state’s presentation of reality. Combined 
with targeted repression of troublesome individuals and the violent suppression of street 
protest, Russian informational autocracy has been adept at monopolizing information in 
order to sustain itself. Since traditional media is largely controlled, the internet remains the 
most credible potential threat to the state’s comparatively unified informational front. This 
threat applies even to members of the Russian elite, where exposure to diverse 
perspectives via the internet correlated with more positive attitudes towards the west, as 
opposed to elites whose media diet consisted of state-controlled sources (Rivera and Bryan 
2019; Tkacheva 2019). Yet it is imperative that restrictions are not seen as too draconian, so 
a limited amount of relatively open internet communication is tolerated in order to mollify 
the population. Known as networked authoritarianism (MacKinnon 2011), this tolerance 
serves both as a release valve for social pressures and as a means of defusing criticism, 
because citizens do have the right to communicate and complain. At the same time, this is a 
precarious freedom, fluid and subject to disappearing if an invisible line is crossed (Glasius 
et al. 2018). Many people who oppose the state have become skilled at negotiating these 
relatively free spaces left open in informational and networked autocracies. 
There is a tension, however, between maintaining these gaps in order to sustain 
informational autocracy (thereby avoiding the costs and consequences of naked repression), 
and eliminating them because of the potential threats they enable. Oppositional figures are 
adept at exploiting this tension. Thus, resistance assemblages coalesce in new ways to 
evade detection and punishment, while the surveillant assemblage polices the gaps and the 
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increase in authoritarian practices reduces the gaps. In this way, individuals – including the 
three bloggers featured here – continue to voice oppositional discourses throughout the 
shrinking free spaces of the more-or-less digital.  
The terms digital, online, and virtual are often used synonymously to refer to 
interactions mediated through internet technologies, but they are marked by important 
differences. Thinking through Deleuze, it is the virtual that most helpfully transcends the 
illusion of spatial dualism between online and offline realms, engaging a more-or-less digital 
sensibility but traveling beyond it. Whereas the virtual often refers to a simulated, parallel 
version of corporeal reality, the Deleuzian virtual is very real (Shields 2003, 22). It is ripe 
with potentiality, contingent, and always-becoming (Deleuze 2014; Doel 1996; 2000). The 
virtual is rhizomatic, referring to the subterranean tubers that grow horizontally and 
produce both roots and shoots, and are seen as both connected and heterogenous (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2013, 34). Rhizomatic thinking helps make sense of the constant tension, 
dynamism, and immanent potential roiling through the virtual as it coalesces, breaks down, 
and recombines into various surveillant and resistance assemblages.  
Continuing with Deleuze, the Russian state aspires to the arborescent: towering, 
hierarchical, and determinate. The struggle, then, is one where state actors work to impose 
hierarchy, control, and ontological rigidity on the virtual, trying to nail the rhizome into 
place. These tensions between fixity and flux can be rendered visible through a view 
towards strategies and tactics (de Certeau 2011, 36–38), where the state’s rational calculus 
exercised from positions of power takes shape as the surveillant assemblage. In response, 
this begs the question of what resistance tactics could be engaged by individuals as they 
operate opportunistically within parameters imposed by the state.  
This interpretation via strategies and tactics is complicated by the ways in which the 
RuNet defies traditional territorial boundaries. Following de Certeau, since the state 
operates from a delimited place – here, its national territory, where it exerts legal authority 
– strategies to dominate the RuNet are actually battles to expand state power beyond the 
borders of its legal remit. These are attempts to extend the territory of the Russian state – 
virtually, yes, but no less real. Within this context, tactics are the individual efforts to resist 
these strategies of extending state power, of fixing the virtual. The empirical sections of this 
paper explore two of these tactics, as expressed in the activities of three bloggers who 
attempted to evade virtual state domination. Their challenges, successes, and failures 
illustrate the decreasing spaces for expression and opposition within Russia’s informational 
autocracy, while highlighting the need for sustained resistance and solidarity, both 
domestically and internationally. 
 
Working in the authoritarian virtual  
Contemporary Russia is not friendly to political opposition: stories of harassment, assault, 
imprisonment, or murder are common and, on average, less than a third of Russians think a 
protest of any size is possible in their city (Levada Center 2019). Despite this, vibrant 
oppositional cultures do exist, though they take ambiguous shapes in order to evade state 
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repression (Fröhlich and Jacobsson 2019). Yet street actions remain challenging and often 
dangerous, which has caused opposition cultures to thrive in the worlds of art and music 
(Jonson 2015). There are debates about the distinctions between countercultures, protest, 
and opposition (Gabowitsch 2017), but here, I define opposition as action taken against the 
state or in defiance of state narratives, and in this sense, opposition flourishes on the 
RuNet. I do not engage in definitional debates about the Russian opposition (Gel’man 
2015a; 2005; White 2015), nor do I believe that ‘the opposition’ is a coherent group.  
In parallel with the diminishing opportunities for street protest, there exists the 
potential for virtual opposition to engender political change (Gainous, Wagner, and Ziegler 
2018). There is a wealth of multidisciplinary literature regarding online opposition, but the 
majority of studies seem to privilege the connections between social media and street 
protest (see Howard and Hussain 2013; Jost et al. 2018; Merrill and Pries 2019; Penney and 
Dadas 2014; Ruijgrok 2017, and for Russia in particular, Radchenko, Pisarevskaya, and 
Ksenofontova 2012). Clearly, mass in-person protest occupies a coveted spot atop the 
hierarchy of resistance scholarship, and while I am sympathetic to many of these studies, I 
disagree with the implicit assumption that virtual opposition only matters so long as it spurs 
physical action. This is not an acknowledgment that electronic civil disobedience is 
fundamentally self-defeating (Vlavo 2012), but rather an argument that the virtual actually 
does contains the potential to destabilize state hierarchies. The rhizome is always-
becoming, and within resistance assemblages there is always the possibility for actors to 
reconfigure relations in ways that diminish or even eliminate autocratic power. That the 
state punishes dissent on the RuNet suggests that Russian informational autocracy is more 
vulnerable than it might seem, and that the authorities take the virtual seriously. This paper 
is grounded in the premise that we should take the virtual seriously as well.  
There is a huge amount of political and oppositional activity on the Russian internet, 
but rather than focus on opposition figures outright, I focus on bloggers. There are 
multitudes of bloggers in Russia working at different scales (Gorny 2009), and blogging has 
grown to resemble a slick and profitable media industry instead of the amateurish content 
that the name might connote. Blogging means creating and maintaining high-quality, 
engaging content across numerous internet platforms, and the financial rewards for 
popularity can be immense. The three bloggers featured here might not be considered 
activists or opposition figures, but they were targeted for state repression because they 
marketed themselves in various ways against the state. Starting from Russia’s authoritarian 
turn after Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency, I followed the bloggers from 2011 – 
2019 by engaging a virtual ethnographic sensitivity (Hine 2017) that eschews territorial 
boundedness and instead foregrounds flows, connections, and mediated interactions (Hine 
2000, 64).  
All three bloggers produced written, photographic, and video content on a variety of 
platforms, popular and provocative enough to warrant attention from the authorities, and 
all three engaged tactics to evade state repression. Over the course of the study period, I 
traced their activities and collected their content, but did not participate in the public 
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geographies of their social media followings (Kitchin et al. 2013). Nor did I collect material 
posted by private individuals to these public forums, following robust privacy and 
anonymity protections (franzke et al. 2020), and out of concern for potential downstream 
effects due to my highlighting their statements (Williams, Burnap, and Sloan 2017). Instead, 
I focused only on posts by the three bloggers – public figures – who used the internet to 
publicize and promote their chosen issues and, also, themselves.  
To understand each blogger’s online presence and oppositional activity, I identified 
the sites where each was most popular: Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, Instagram, and VK. 
With a custom-built tool written in Python, I extracted blogger-generated text from these 
sites to create an archive. I used qualitative data analysis software to code this archive, but 
had to omit visual material, as it was not feasible to catalog thousands of videos. Instead I 
watched roughly 20% of the total videos and judged the remainder by their titles and 
descriptions. To approximate how political each blogger was, I coded the archive on a 4-
point scale: purely, partially, slightly, and not at all political, with the understanding that this 
rating is subjective and open to dispute. In future projects I plan to employ automated 
sentiment analysis but this is not an unproblematic solution either (Giachanou and Crestani 
2016). As the bloggers are public figures, I augmented the archive with relevant traditional 
media coverage, and then triangulated these online methods with conversations with six 
Russians (three activists, two citizen journalists, and one mainstream reporter). These 
interactions were part of a separate project that did not focus on Russian opposition. 
Instead, the themes discussed here emerged inductively over time, parallel to the original 
project. In all cases, participants’ personally identifiable information was anonymized from 
the start, and no material links people to their statements. The reason for this caution is due 
to ethical and safety concerns when doing research in authoritarian contexts (Glasius et al. 
2018). Overall, my aim was to synthesize a picture of each blogger: their reach, the depth of 
their oppositional engagement, and what happened to them in the context of Russia’s 
authoritarian turn.  
Despite their status as public figures, analyzing these bloggers raises ethical 
questions: as opposed to private social media users, these people make a living from their 
work and wish it to be distributed widely – indeed, they routinely exhort their audiences to 
share their content. The question is whether my attention here – focusing on an 
oppositional posture – could lead to harm. This is a legitimate risk and I cannot guarantee 
that this discussion will not prompt a response from the state, particularly as they are 
already visible to the security services – and one of them actually is in prison. However, I 
contend that ignoring their stories is also unacceptable, because cases like these are crucial 
for understanding strategies of suppression and tactics of resistance in contemporary 
Russia. Given that the RuNet does not conform to territorial boundaries, these insights 
apply outside the country as well, and might hold value in other situations where 
authoritarian practices seek to dominate the virtual.  
 
 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Blogging the Virtual 
 9 
The commodification of opposition and the tactic of escape  
Kamikadzedead is the pseudonym of a blogger who has grown popular as a vociferous critic 
of the state. His YouTube channel is the hub of his online presence and, by 2019, 
Kamikadzedead had over 1.7 million YouTube subscribers and 1,309 videos. His presence 
elsewhere was smaller, with about 95,000 followers each on Twitter and VK., and his activity 
on other platforms generally serves to drive viewers to his videos. Overall, I coded his 
content as 94% purely political, 4% partially political, and 2% apolitical (mostly vacation 
snapshots to his 29,000 Instagram followers).  
Kamikadzedead presents himself in opposition to all scales of the state, and his 
videos target everyone from the president down to petty peripheral bureaucrats. His 
outspoken style has earned a loyal following and he often frames his arguments around 
inequalities by demonstrating the effects of corruption (for typical examples, see 
Kamikadzedead 2019; 2020). An activist explained: “I like that he’s not scared to say what’s 
happening. It gives a good feeling, like you’re not the only one, like you’re not crazy.” This 
statement points to two ways that Kamikadzedead defies informational autocracy: first, his 
videos propagate alternative discourses, and second, the comments section below each 
video provides space to nourish oppositional communities. In this way, Kamikadzedead’s 
videos helped this activist locate herself within the gaps of informational autocracy.  
At the same time, Kamikadzedead is not a political activist in the traditional sense. 
Instead, blogging is his business, and the product he sells is outraged political commentary. 
It is unclear how much money he makes, because YouTube’s monetization deals are opaque 
and tailored to each creator’s clout as measured by viewer engagement (Caplan and 
Gillespie 2020). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that his audience of millions allows 
him to command high prices for advertising. Since he presents himself as oppositional, this 
business imperative does not constrain his political posture. Fittingly, he pitches products 
and services aimed at the dissident class, for instance VPN software to evade state 
surveillance, or legal services to avoid mandatory military service. Nevertheless, financial 
logics do affect his behavior, notably in the pace of his production. One of the challenges of 
blogging as a business is the pressure to create regular content, particularly as prolific 
creators tend to get paid more (Caplan and Gillespie 2020). Kamikadzedead’s prolific 
publishing schedule is only possible with the help of his viewers, who submit homemade 
videos – often of crumbling local infrastructures – for him to feature and discuss. These 
videos receive hundreds of thousands of views and Kamikadzedead always acknowledges 
the person who submitted. These interactions offer more than a glimmer of fame: they 
nourish an audience-performer bond while shedding light on regions and topics that remain 
under-investigated by traditional media. Kamikadzedead inhabits a space that is both 
explicitly oppositional but also audience-dependent like any other content creator. 
State authorities have not ignored Kamikadzedead’s popularity, and his comment 
sections are routinely filled with cookie-cutter pro-government messages. More insidiously, 
Kamikadzedead has noticed that likes and views often disappear from his videos. These are 
the currency of the YouTuve and removing them reduces revenue, but this could only 
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happen if the platform were coordinating with authorities. While this is possible, given the 
state’s access to servers in Russia, there exists no proof of this specific. Still, Russian 
YouTube is often forced to fulfill requests from RosKomNadzor to delete videos or block 
entire channels (RBC 2017).  
These attacks on Kamikadzedead’s livelihood can be explored by thinking through 
the surveillant assemblage. These processes capture online activity, abstracting humans 
from their bodies and territorial locations, and then reassembling flows into a 
“decorporealized body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality,” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 611). 
Just as the corporeal body can be monitored and controlled, so too is the data double 
subject to surveillance for marketing and security. Though tethered, the data double exists 
separately from the corporeal body, in the sense that one can engage in political activity 
while the other does not. This explains why the state targeted Kamikadzedead’s data double 
for repression, but left his corporeal body in peace. Yet virtuality transcends binary 
limitations and sees the blurry interconnectedness between the data double and corporeal 
body. In keeping with this, once Kamikadzedead’s channel passed one million subscribers, 
state authorities charged him for violation of Article 110 of the Russian Criminal Code, which 
outlaws driving someone to suicide – the result of a poorly done joke in an early video. 
Worried for his physical safety, Kamikadzedead fled Russia (TV Rain 2017). He explained: 
 
“I got scared that at 6 in the morning, someone would break into my flat. Some Nazi 
or religious extremist, or – much worse – a Putin supporter, and that they would 
disappear me.” (Nemtsova 2018)  
 
This is the tactic of escape: removing one’s corporeal body from potential harm, evoking the 
classic concept of exit / voice / loyalty (Hirschman 1970; 1993). Though thoroughly 
reworked in recent decades, at its heart this notion illuminates how an individual, when 
faced with unacceptable circumstances, can choose either to leave, to speak up, or to 
display loyalty, and it has been employed to explain a range of economic and political 
phenomena. Michaelsen (2018) carries this concept into the era of digital protest, 
explaining the strategies employed by repressive states to suppress dissent beyond 
territorial borders. Distinguishing between vertical voice (speaking to power) and horizontal 
voice (forging social links to create shared identities), Michaelsen demonstrates that 
horizontal voice can continue even after exit. The RuNet allows Kamikadzedead to continue 
his business of political outrage from abroad, so that his horizontal voice still carries the 
potential to reorder the rhizome. Yet repressive strategies have not ceased since he fled, 
and he recently closed his comment sections to all participants – a move that could alienate 
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Synopticism and the tactic of visibility  
If Kamikadzedead attempted a variation on exit, then Ilya Varlamov employed a variation on 
voice. Varlamov sits at the heart of a bespoke online media empire that produces video and 
written content across numerous platforms, and he is credited by Forbes as a dollar 
multimillionaire (Zhitkova 2019). The core of Varlamov’s activities is urban analysis, though 
he sometimes strays into political commentary, and his videos are slick and modern with 
high production values and consistent branding. The videos are formulaic and enjoyable: he 
explores a city and explains what is done well or poorly. He delights in traveling abroad to 
find examples of good urban planning, and while he sometimes criticizes foreign cities, the 
bulk of his infamous grumpiness is directed at Russian urbanity, which he usually lampoons 
with ill-concealed glee (for typical examples see Varlamov 2020; 2019).  
By the end of 2019, Varlamov had 1.17 million subscribers and more than 900 videos 
on YouTube, with 310,000 followers on Twitter and 128,000 tweets. He tweets prolifically, 
filling the microblogging space with jokes and complaints. He also maintains a text blog and 
several Telegram channels, all of which provide something like an independent news 
service. To create his written content, Varlamov – like Kamikadzedead – sources 
contributions from his audience and then adds his own commentary. At its best, the news 
service aspect of his work (much of it curated by staff rather than Varlamov) is close to 
citizen journalism, albeit attached to a business model that enriches Varlamov Inc. His fans 
do not seem to mind: “Varlamov isn’t responsible to anyone so he can go where he wants 
and say what he wants,” a journalist told me. “I think it’s wonderful that he’s making good 
money. Why shouldn’t he?” This journalist followed Varlamov on Twitter, YouTube, and 
Telegram, and explained that Twitter was for on-the-road updates, YouTube for long-form 
pieces, but Telegram was like a local news service that he checked several times a day. That 
a mainstream journalist would value Varlamov’s Telegram channel as a news source speaks 
volumes about the gaps in Russia’s traditional media landscape. This journalist is not alone 
in his views: by 2019 Varlamov had nearly 300,000 followers on Telegram.   
Though he is politically liberal, Varlamov is less overtly oppositional than 
Kamikadzedead. In this study he was coded as only 47% political overall, only sometimes 
bringing in politics as a subset of his typical discussions on urban problems. Even with this 
circumspect posture, however, Varlamov sometimes runs afoul of the authorities. These 
incidents typically provoke him to make a few transparently political videos. For example, in 
the run-up to the 2018 World Cup, Varlamov filmed a series that explored urban 
preparations in every host city. Usually he films without incident, but in Volgograd he was 
stopped twice: once by police for recording at a tram stop, and once by the federal security 
services for filming the renovated central train station. Unable to document the city’s 
improvements, Varlamov instead filmed broken roads, destitute parks, and crumbling 
buildings, complaining about the idiocy of the authorities (Varlamov 2018b). 
A more dramatic encounter occurred while Varlamov was filming a live television 
interview via mobile video on a Moscow street. The nationwide audience watched in real-
time as officers approached Varlamov on camera from behind, interrupted him mid-
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sentence, and shut down the interview. He was detained for several hours but then, to his 
surprise, released without charges or explanation. He then filmed a political video where he 
credited his release to his status as a public figure: because he was famous, and arrested on 
camera, other famous and influential people raised an immediate outcry (Varlamov 2018a). 
This is the tactic of visibility, leveraging the public gaze to secure safety. It is a form of 
synopticism – an inversion of panoptical surveillance – wherein large numbers of people 
focus on the same thing  (Hier 2003; Haggerty and Ericson 2007). As a famous blogger, 
Varlamov he was standing in the center of the synoptic gaze when he was arrested, and it 
was the immediate outcry originating from this position that secured his release.  
 
Fragility and the failure of tactics  
One of the problems with the tactic of visibility is that the synoptic gaze is not universally 
available. In a street protest, for instance, average people might take advantage of a 
synoptic defense relatively easily, but online this calculus changes to favor the famous. 
Alexander Valov, founder and chief editor of BlogSochi, demonstrates this problem with the 
tactic of visibility, as he failed to engage synoptic safety due to his limited fame.  
BlogSochi was a local news service that highlighted the Sochi region’s natural beauty 
and outdoor recreation options, but grew to investigate environmental crimes and 
participate in local politics. It exists now only in shards, scrubbed from the internet after 
Valov’s arrest. This ephemerality posed a methodological challenge for research, as I was 
wholly unprepared for BlogSochi’s disappearance. What remained to me were the few 
articles I had saved locally, the notes I had taken, and my imprecise memory. Later, I 
discovered traces in the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, but these were only 
incomplete snapshots. When appropriate, I used conversations with Sochi residents to 
complement these missing materials. 
BlogSochi began as Valov’s actual blog, and although it grew in ambition and 
professionalism, it never lost its slightly homemade feel nor ventured beyond its home 
region. Valov’s hub was his blog, but he was also active on VK and eventually on YouTube. In 
2017, he proudly announced that he had 5.7 million total video views, 465,000 monthly 
viewers, and 3000 subscribers. These numbers might not compare to Varlamov and 
Kamikadzedead, but they represent significant regional attention, as Sochi had 438,000 
residents in 2019 (Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2020). Moreover, BlogSochi’s 
relatively small audience, local focus, and hometown aesthetic gave it an unmatched 
authenticity. Sochi residents explained that Valov’s native status made the site trustworthy, 
particularly in comparison to national outlets. 
Valov’s investigations of the preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympics boosted his 
regional fame, as he gave voice to locals whose complaints were ignored by traditional 
media. Capitalizing on this attention, he began professionalizing BlogSochi by developing a 
logo, selling advertisements, and sponsoring local events, even as he adopted more of an 
oppositional posture. In 2016, after showing the post-Olympic sites to American journalists, 
Valov was arrested by the federal security services and accused of organizing illegal protests 
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(Kravchenko 2016). Unlike Varlamov, whose fame helped secure his rapid release, Valov was 
imprisoned for five days. When released, he filed a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights (Kavkazky Uzel 2017), and started using BlogSochi for more overt oppositional 
politics. He did not attempt the tactic of escape, likely because his work was so locally 
grounded that it would be impossible to continue from afar, to say nothing of his love for 
Sochi.   
In 2017, Valov discovered a seafront home with a private swimming pool built on a 
section of public beach. This was an illegal seizure of public land. He photographed the pool 
and published an investigation on BlogSochi, challenging municipal authorities to uphold the 
law. The homeowner, however, turned out to be an influential senator from Moscow with a 
vacation home in Sochi. The senator responded to BlogSochi’s allegations by accusing Valov 
of insulting his honor and trying to solicit bribes. The words of a senator carry more weight 
than those of a blogger, so the police came to arrest Valov at his flat. Valov refused to open 
the door and began livestreaming to BlogSochi from his phone, an attempt to engage the 
tactic of visibility and the security of the synoptic gaze.  
Though both arrests took place live, there were major differences between 
Varlamov and Valov that account for the divergence in their outcomes. Whereas Varlamov 
was clearly visible to his audience, Valov filmed in the dark as the police cut the electricity to 
his flat. Next, police destroyed Valov’s metal security door with a power saw, and the small 
live audience heard the sounds of physical struggle (see Gostev 2018). Valov was arrested, 
charged with extorting a federal official, and imprisoned, and there are allegations that he 
has been assaulted in jail (CPJ 2018; Popkov 2018). Despite legal challenges, some small 
local protests, and scattered media attention, Valov was sentenced to six years in a penal 
colony (Kozkina 2018).  
BlogSochi thrived because Valov was a Sochi local, but this regionality also limited his 
ability to engage the tactic of visibility. Ultimately, his audience was too small to engage a 
successful synoptic defense. Valov was punished for trying to exercise vertical voice, 
exposing the lawbreaking of the powerful, but his horizontal voice still threatened 
informational autocracy so long as BlogSochi continued to exist. For this reason, BlogSochi 
was swiftly deleted from the internet, demonstrating the purpose of forcing websites to 
register with RosKomNadzor, and the value of tethering the RuNet to physical 
infrastructures within Russia. Valov’s investigations exist now as incomplete snapshots in 
scattered spaces overlooked by authorities or perhaps out of their reach. The BlogSochi 
domain is for sale, and the VK page has been transformed into pablum with articles like “50 
best things about visiting Sochi!”), and Valov remains in prison.  
 
Conclusion: Blogging to reorder the rhizome 
The blurriness of the RuNet encompasses “both the virtual and its actualization 
simultaneously, without there being any assignable limit between the two” (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2007, 149). The bloggers featured here made their living in this blurriness, working 
within the gaps left by the tensions inherent in informational autocracy (Murakami Wood 
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2013). These gaps – between the need to maintain the semblance of free speech and the 
need to reduce the potential threat of that freedom – are filled with the immanent potential 
to reorder the rhizome away from authoritarian control and towards more egalitarian 
configurations. Exploring these gaps is salient both within and beyond Russia, given the 
increase in authoritarian practices around the globe (Guriev and Treisman 2019).  
The bloggers were not activists or opposition figures in the traditional sense (Lokot 
2018), but rather presented themselves within an oppositional grammar, whether in 
political, urban, or environmental terms, while carving lucrative niches in Russia’s growing 
internet market. All three bloggers attempted tactics for safety after their oppositional 
postures garnered the attention of state security services. In following their stories, this 
paper demonstrates how the RuNet is neither liberation technology (Diamond 2010; 
Diamond and Plattner 2012) nor a tool of state repression (Golkar 2011; Pospieszna and 
Galus 2019), but rather something in between, fluid and contingent.   
In order to maintain informational autocracy, the surveillant assemblage flagged the 
bloggers for repression once their vertical and/or horizontal voices grew too loud. 
Depending on their positionalities, each of them faced different options and outcomes: 
escaping, engaging the synoptic protection granted to fame, or imprisonment. Two of the 
three were able to continue working despite repressive state attention, demonstrating the 
latitude for emancipatory potential within Russian informational autocracy, as well as the 
ability to participate in the RuNet even outside Russian territory. The gaps for this kind of 
opposition are shrinking, however: there has been a string of state attempts to dominate 
the RuNet (Novie Izvestiya 2017), working not only through governing institutions like 
RosKomNadzor and surveillance technologies like SORM, but also through more extreme 
isolationist strategies that mirror the shutdowns and firewalls of Iran or China (Akbari 2020; 
Qiang 2019). Thus, building on President Putin’s longstanding criticism of the internet as a 
CIA project and a corrupting foreign influence (MacAskill 2014), lawmakers recently 
approved a so-called “sovereign internet” bill that attempts to make the RuNet correspond 
exactly to Russian territorial boundaries (Ilyushina 2019). Framed as a matter of national 
security, the sovereign internet bill not only establishes greater state power over the RuNet, 
but also grants authorities the ability to sever links to the internet outside Russia, creating a 
totally independent network (Lipman and Lokot 2019). This would fracture the RuNet, 
cutting the sovereign section away from Russian-speaking parts in the world outside Russian 
state control. At the same time, the expectations of an increasingly-online population put 
pressure on the authorities to grow the digital economy and boost international 
connectedness (Blanutsa 2019; Dobrolyubova, Alexandrov, and Yefremov 2017). It is not 
clear how informational autocracy can survive under this tension, and this may be one of 
the explanatory factors behind the recent closures in Russia due to the rise in more nakedly 
authoritarian practices.  
The struggles on the RuNet are redrawing national and global geographies through 
blurry and contingent processes that are tethered to material infrastructures within 
traditional territorial boundaries, but that also transcend them. This virtuality defies the 
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imaginary binary between digital and corporeal, and contains the immanent potential to 
restructure the rhizome away from authoritarian control. Though embattled, the RuNet still 
harbors vibrant oppositional cultures, and the bloggers featured here all made a name for 
themselves through an oppositional posture. Put another way, they thrived within the 
relatively free spaces afforded by informational autocracy, and made a living by propagating 
alternative narratives that could destabilize autocratic control. With a view towards the 
shrinking spaces for free political expression, their stories shed light on some of the tactics 
used to evade repression – not just in Russia but in an alarming number of states 
worldwide. Within this global authoritarian turn, it is imperative to analyze both state 
strategies for more-than-digital domination and the tactics through which individuals 
attempt to reorder the rhizome and resist. 
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